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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:54 pm
Time: 10:54 pm
Results for gangs (mexico)
5 results foundAuthor: Amnesty International Title: Invisible Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico Summary: Every year, tens of thousands of people travel through Mexico without legal permission as irregular migrants. Most are Central Americans on their way to the U.S. border, hoping for a new life far from the poverty they have left behind. Their journey is dangerous. Criminal gangs target the main routes used by irregular migrants. Kidnapping, extortion, ill-treatment and sexual violence by these gangs are widespread. This report presents findings from a survey of 110 migrants who were interviewed in June 2009. Their statements indicate that a large number of abuses are committed against irregular migrants, and that they are almost never reported. The report ends with a number of recommendations calling on the authorities at all levels to improve protection and access to justice for migrants and to end impunity for those who carry out abuses against them. Details: London: Amnesty International Publications, 2010. 44p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 118265 Keywords: Gangs (Mexico)Migrants (Mexico) |
Author: Reyna, Enrique J. Title: Exploiting Weaknesses: An Approach to Counter Cartel Strategy Summary: The thesis, “Exploiting Weaknesses: An Approach to Counter Cartel Strategy,” provided an in-depth case study analysis of Los Zetas transnational criminal network to gain an understanding on its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The thesis utilized social movement theory to illuminate its mobilizing structure and key essential factors that make Los Zetas vulnerable to disruption. In addition, the study identified Los Zetas’ financial support structure to expose its insidious methods. Finally, the thesis utilized social network analysis and geographical information systems to gain an understanding of its organizational networks, deduce possible safe havens, and key terrain of Los Zetas. Ultimately, the employment of the aforementioned theories revealed essential vulnerabilities, which form the essence of a practical disruption policy recommendation against Los Zetas. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 139p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 3, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=699795 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=699795 Shelf Number: 124811 Keywords: Gangs (Mexico)Geospatial Information Systems (GIS)Los ZetasOrganized CrimeSocial Network Analysis |
Author: Southern Pulse Title: Acapulco Criminal Environment - June 2012 Summary: In recent years, the Acapulco Metropolitan Zone (AMZ) has experienced some of the highest levels of criminal violence in Mexico. The AMZ presents an interesting case where two small criminal organizations have battled for territorial control of the city with the external support of much larger cartels operating at the national level. The AMZ also provides a snapshot of how the criminal environment evolves as organizations adapt, and ultimately present a public security challenge that neither the Mexican government nor many international businesses are prepared to confront. As a contribution to the ongoing conversation about the direction of public security in Mexico, Southern Pulse published in January 2012 its first ebook, Beyond 2012, which presented a chapter on public security in Mexico. This chapter concluded with a consideration of a future when “super-empowered” street gangs will eclipse groups such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation: As we theorized in 2005, the devolution of Los Zetas, of the Gulf Cartel, and the predictable dissolution of the Sinaloa Federation points to the formation of several criminal organizations, not a Mega Cartel. Whereas Mexico under the guise of six large, national-level criminal enterprises in 2006 could have been considered a sea of tranquility punctuated by islands of violence (less than 100 municipalities out of 2,000-plus with violence) the opposite may be proven true by early 2014, as the number of well-armed criminal groups jumps from the six significant groups we counted in 2006 - Sinaloa Federation, La Familia, Gulf Cartel, Beltra-Leyva Organization, Arellano-Felix Organization, Carrillo-Fuentes Organization - to over 10 in 2012 with a steady growth of new groups to bring the total number to possibly over 20 by the end of 2014. By the end of 2014, the men organized by El Chapo and his principal rival Heriberto Lazcano will no longer be the principal drivers of violence across Mexico. At the hyper-local level, super-powered street gangs, armed with Twitter, You Tube, the weapon of fear, and an enviable armory will man-handle local politicians and municipal police. We believe that while the above process continues forward beyond June 2012, there are certain cities in Mexico today that present an advanced case of how the criminal system in Mexico will evolve as street gangs become more powerful. Acapulco lists among the top four, which include Monterrey (See Monterrey Street Gangs Report), Guadalajara, and Juarez. A fifth city, Tijuana, will serve as a “control case,” where we see the historical dominance of one group to be a harbinger of less violence and little to no development of street gangs. Within this brief report, we would like to present our assessment of the criminal environment in Acapulco from both a strategic and tactical viewpoint to support an understanding of how the evolving criminal system in Acapulco could impact the daily lives of those who live there, as well as the business, particularly in the tourism industry, operating in the area. Just as we stated in our March 2012 city report on the Monterrey Metropolitan Area (MMA), we would like to add that in the best interest of time and space, this report on criminal activity in the AMZ makes some general assumptions: The top-tier transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the primary drivers behind violence in Mexico in 2012; The Mexican government will not significantly alter its current strategy in 2012 or beyond, into the next administration; TCOs in Mexico are in constant communication with leadership elements of street gangs; TCOs do not solely rely on drug trafficking as a source of illicit revenue; and, The line between TCOs and street gangs is so blurred that many in Mexico still consider the two to be one single unit of criminality. Details: Annapolis, MD: Southern Pulse, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2012 at http://www.southernpulse.com/e-books/acapulco-criminal-environment Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.southernpulse.com/e-books/acapulco-criminal-environment Shelf Number: 126694 Keywords: Evaluative StudiesGangs (Mexico)Organized Crime (Mexico)Transnational Crime |
Author: Jones, Nathan P. Title: Understanding and Addressing Youth in "Gangs" in Mexico Summary: This report seeks to understand and define the gang issue in Mexico, establish the regional histories and sociologies of what is known about these gangs, and understand the causes of youth gang involvement. The paper briefly describes U.S.-Mexico bilateral efforts on youth gang prevention via the Merida Initiative, and identifies a sampling of existing civil society groups and programs geared specifically toward addressing youth gangs in Mexico and Central America. The report concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the U.S. and Mexican governments on how to best support civil society and strengthen relevant state institutions. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on Civic Engagement and Public Security in Mexico: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/jones_youth_gangs.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/jones_youth_gangs.pdf Shelf Number: 129819 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangs (Mexico)Merida InitiativeYouth Gangs |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juarez Summary: Just four years ago, Ciudad Juarez was under siege from criminal gang members and being sabotaged by crooked cops. Killings and kidnappings spiralled out of control despite the deployment of thousands of soldiers and federal police. Today Juarez is on the path to recovery: public investments in social programs and institutional reform plus a unique model of citizen engagement have helped bring what was once dubbed the world's "murder capital" back from the brink. Daunting problems persist. Juarez remains an unruly frontier city of great inequalities, where traffickers and other criminals can too easily find recruits among a largely young population, many of whom still lack good jobs or education. To sustain progress, citizens and local policymakers need to assess achievements and obstacles, relaunching their partnership and upgrading efforts to strengthen local institutions and address social inequities. Though Juarez remains fragile, there are reasons for guarded optimism: civil society leaders - including business and professional groups, non-profit organisations and academics - hold the government accountable for any increase in crime, meeting regularly with municipal, state and federal officials in a unique Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia (Security and Justice Working Group), an independent body including citizens and authorities. All three levels of government remain committed in principle to addressing the causes of violence through social programs aimed at the poor communities that have borne the brunt of the killings. President Felipe Calderon's administration invested more than $380 million in 2010-2011 under its Todos Somos Juarez (TSJ, We are all Juarez) initiative to finance social programs designed to make communities, especially their young people, more resistant to violent crime. Much of the money went to expanding existing programs for the urban poor and building or renovating community centres, schools and hospitals. But the impact of these efforts was never evaluated, largely wasting the opportunity to create innovative, sustainable programs, subject to outside review and evaluation. When he took office in December 2012, President Enrique Pena Nieto promised to make crime and violence prevention central to his security strategy, adopting and adapting some of the strategies initiated by his predecessor. Among his first acts was to order nine ministries to join forces on a national program. Its objectives are sweepingly ambitious: promote citizen participation and a culture of peace and respect for the law; address the risk factors that render children, adolescents, women and other groups vulnerable to violence; create and reclaim public spaces to foster peaceful coexistence; and strengthen institutional capacity at the federal, state and municipal level. The National Program for the Social Prevention of Violence and Delinquency channels funding into high-risk zones chosen to serve as laboratories for social change, including three within Ciudad Juarez. This "socio-urban acupuncture" approach holds promise. Officials say crime rates have already fallen within many of the target zones and promise that detailed surveys will measure impact going forward. But the effort in Juarez itself has been plagued by delays and controversy. The lack of transparency in project selection and monitoring has given rise to accusations of mismanagement and political favouritism. Local authorities are justifiably proud of progress in reducing homicide and other high-impact crimes, such as kidnapping, but more is needed to keep Jurez from again falling victim to a surge of violence. The model of citizen participation embodied in the Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia should be extended to the neighbourhood level, so that working class and poor communities are empowered to monitor violence- prevention projects and work with law enforcement to combat crime. Local police must play a more important role. Authorities on the municipal, state and federal levels should open their efforts to greater scrutiny, crafting long-term strategies that can be continued past the next electoral cycle. The achievements of Juarez and the surrounding state of Chihuahua offer hope for other Mexican cities and regions still suffering epidemic rates of violent crimes, including murder, often at the hands of criminals in league with local authorities. The focus of federal action has shifted to the north east, where the state of Tamaulipas now leads the country in kidnappings, and the south west, where the state of Guerrero and the city of Acapulco have the highest rates of homicides per capita. National authorities have poured soldiers and police into these regions while promising funding for social programs, much as they did a few years ago in Chihuahua. But they have not been able to stem the crisis of confidence in government at all levels: municipal, state and federal. The kidnapping and apparent killing of 43 students from the rural teaching college of Ayotzinapa by a criminal gang allegedly backed by corrupt police has sparked violent protests in Guerrero and mass marches in Mexico City. Perhaps the most important lesson of Juarez is that crime must be tackled through the combined effort of authorities and citizens. Opaque, top-down solutions that fail to address the concerns of local communities - eliciting their ideas and soliciting their support - are unlikely to produce sustainable progress against the scourge of violent crime. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2015. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 54: Accessed February 26, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/mexico/054-back-from-the-brink-saving-ciudad-juarez.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/mexico/054-back-from-the-brink-saving-ciudad-juarez.pdf Shelf Number: 134679 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceGangs (Mexico)HomicidesKidnappingsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolent Crime |